Private Law: Security Devices by Dainow, Joseph
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 26 | Number 3
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1965-1966 Term: A Faculty Symposium
Symposium: Administration of Criminal Justice
April 1966
Private Law: Security Devices
Joseph Dainow
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Joseph Dainow, Private Law: Security Devices, 26 La. L. Rev. (1966)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol26/iss3/10
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
joint wrongdoing is an injury to a third person, while com-
parative negligence applies where the consequence of the joint
wrongdoing is an injury to one of the wrongdoers himself. Had
Louisiana. enjoyed the benefit of a comparative negligence
statute,72 as well as a contribution measure, Evans would have
recovered for only half of his own loss (since last clear chance
doctrines should have no place where a scheme of comparative
negligence prevails)73 just as he was similarly obliged to pay
only half the loss suffered by the blameless passengers (the
present rule under the contribution statute).
SECURITY DEVICES
Joseph Dainow*
SURETYSHIP
The contract of suretyship must be made in writing in order
to have any existence even as between the parties.' However,
instead of a secondary liability in the event of the debtor's de-
fault, another person may undertake a primary responsibility
for the indebtedness, and this relationship can be established
without any writing.
In Star Sales Co. v. Arnoult,2 the defendant had under-
taken responsibility for credit sales to Colonial Distributors.
From its analysis of the facts, the court concluded that the run-
ning account on a credit basis was in essence with Colonial Dis-
tributors and that the defendant's position was intended by the
parties to be one of secondary liability in the nature of a surety.
Since there was no writing, there was no suretyship; and the
case was dismissed. Actually, the plaintiff had expressly refused
to open a credit account for Colonial Distributors and only
agreed to open such an account in the name of the defendant.
Nevertheless, the plaintiff knew that the purchases were being
made for Colonial Distributors, and therefore the court treated
the situation as if credit had been extended to Colonial Distribu-
72. See the discussion in Malone, Comparative Negligence-Louisiana's Forgot-
ten Heritage, 6 LA. L. REV. 125 (1945) ; INS. L.J. 217 (1946).
73. See the discussion in PROSSER, TORTS § 66, at 449 (3d ed. 1954).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2278 (1870).
2. 169 So. 2d 178 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
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tors and on the basis that the parties intended only a suretyship
for the defendant.
The court of appeal did not find any manifest error in this
evaluation of the facts by the trial court; nor can these observa-
tions imply that there was. There does, however, seem to be a
little inconsistency to say that the plaintiff who refused to open
a credit account for Colonial Distributors eventually did make
the credit sales with the intention of setting up a security which
would give him no protection. The moral of the story is to see
a lawyer first and be sure to have everything in proper writ-
ten form.
PLEDGE
The requirement of delivery for the existence of a pledge,
even as between the immediate parties, has been the subject
of previous comments, 3 and a new decision in Powers v. Motors
Sec. Co.4 is significant in its reaffirmation of this point. A fuller
discussion of this case and the issues involved has already ap-
peared.5
PRIVILEGES
In connection with the lessor's privilege, the Civil Code, arti-
cles 2705-2709, provides for its operation not only on the effects
of the immediate tenant but also on the effects of the under-
tenant (sublessee) and of third persons. If the effects seized
on the leased premises belong to an undertenant, the liability is
limited to the extent of the latter's indebtedness to the principal
lessee. Thus, the decisive factor in a case may be the determina-
tion of the legal relationship between the lessee and the owner
of the things seized on the leased premises.
Such a situation developed in the case of Riverside Realty
Co. v. Southern Bowling Corp.6 Upon a sequestration of all the
movables in the leased bowling alley, the sublessee obtained a
release of its property upon a showing that (1) there was a
sublease, and (2) there was no rent due under this contract.
Of course, the facts in each case must be evaluated by the tests
3. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1956-1957 Term - Se-
curity Devices, 18 LA. L. REV. 49, 50 (1957).
4. 168 So. 2d 922 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964) writ refused, 170 So. 2d 511
(1965).
5. Note, 26 LA. L. REV. 182 (1965).
6. 169 So. 2d 228 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964); writ refused, 170 So. 2d 864
(1965).
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of the contract of lease. Whether it be for food-vending con-
cessions, as in the present case, or for other purposes, the deter-
mination as to whether there is a sublease will also determine
the scope of the lessor's privilege on effects which do not belong
to the principal lessee.
MORTGAGES
A present mortgage may secure future debts, 7 and the so-
called "collateral mortgage" may be reissued without the need
for a new recordation. Since the mortgage's effectiveness
against third persons is fixed by the date of recordation, it
was considered that the original date of recordation continued
to be the effective date of the collateral mortgage regardless
of the number and actual dates of reissuances. The harshness
of this result, with reference to other mortgages which were
recorded against the property prior to the reissuance of the col-
lateral mortgage, was alleviated by the decision in Odom v.
Cherokee Homes, Inc.8 The court held that in competition with
other mortgages, the collateral mortgage ranks from the date
of issuance or reissuance of the note secured by it and not from
the original date of recordation. A very good discussion of this
case and the issues has already appeared in this Review.9
PRESCRIPTION
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ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION
For acquisitive prescription of either ten years or thirty
years, the basic requirement is possession, and this must be a
possession as owner.' In Journet v. Gerard,2 defendant had been
using a strip of land between his residence property and the
street, but the evidence showed record title in the plaintiff. To
the plaintiff's petitory action, the defendant pleaded acquisitive
7. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3292 (1870).
8. 165 So. 2d 855 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964); writs denied, 246 La. 868, 167
So.2d 677 (1965).
9. Note, 25 LA. L. REv. 789 (1965).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3436, 3500 (1870).
2. 173 So. 2d 263 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
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